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     Abstract 
 
           
 
 
 The paper describes how two types of traders, marketmakers and 
speculators, establish their positions and manage their risk exposure. We show that 
balance sheets are insufficient to determine whether a trader is a marketmaker or a 
speculator. On the other hand, trading records describing the evolution of a position over 
time can identify what trading strategy was pursued. Knowing the trading strategy helps 
to evaluate contract compliance, risk exposure, and capital requirements of trading firms. 
Understanding and verifying trader behavior is especially important because leveraged 
trading firms, and individual traders, have traditional incentives to mask their risk-taking 
activities. Without proper monitoring, traders can substitute risky speculation for less 
risky marketmaking to reap potential payoffs. 
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Introduction 
 Trading is a risky business. How risky it is depends on exactly what traders do to 
make money. The first part of this paper identifies two types of traders: (1) Speculators, 
sometimes referred to as proprietary traders, who earn money trying to anticipate the 
direction of future price movements; (2) Customer-based traders, usually called 
marketmakers, who earn money on the bid / ask spread without speculating on future 
prices. Customer-based trading is less risky than speculation. Thus, assessing a trading 
firm’s risk exposure, and the implications for specifying appropriate capital requirements, 
depends, in part, on distinguishing high-risk speculators from low-risk marketmakers. 
 Separating speculators from marketmakers is difficult in practice. The problem is 
speculators sometimes have customers, allowing them to masquerade as marketmakers. 
And marketmakers sometimes become speculators despite their regular access to 
customers. The second part of this paper explains how an outsider, such as a potential 
merger partner or a regulator, can verify the trading profile of a firm. In particular, we 
will show how trading records describing the evolution of a position over time can 
discriminate between marketmakers and speculators. 
 Understanding and verifying trader behavior is important because leveraged 
trading firms, and individual traders, have traditional incentives to mask their risk-taking 
activities (See Jensen and Meckling [1976]). Without proper monitoring, traders can 
substitute risky speculation for less risky marketmaking to reap potential payoffs. This is 
best illustrated by two examples.  
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Risk Assessment    
The value-at-risk (VAR) approach to measuring risk exposure combines the 
amount of a security on the firm’s balance sheet with the security’s variability of returns 
to calculate the likely losses on a position1. We will see that the time period over which 
the variability of returns should be measured depends, in part, on whether a position is 
traded by a marketmaker or a speculator. Thus even though the balance sheet does not 
reveal the trader’s intent in establishing the position, the proper application of VAR in 
measuring risk should distinguish between speculators and marketmakers.  
Consider, for example, an options trading firm whose balance sheet shows that it 
is long out-of- the money 6-month calls on IBM and short the ‘right amount’ of out-of- 
the money 3-month calls on IBM.  It is impossible to tell, from the balance sheet alone, 
whether this is a marketmaker’s position or a speculator’s. But a marketmaker’s tendency 
to close out positions quickly means that the likely losses on the position will be smaller 
under a marketmaker’s strategy compared with a speculator’s. 
 Lower prospective losses means that a marketmaking trading firm (or trading 
division within a firm) can safely operate with less capital than a trading firm with a 
speculator’s strategy. If marketmakers are rewarded with lower capital requirements than 
speculators, traders will try to misrepresent themselves as marketmakers, unless they can 
be prevented from doing so by proper monitoring. 
 
                                                 
1 See Anthony Saunders [2000, Chapter 10] for a discussion of alternative calculations of VAR. 
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Contract Enforcement: MAC Clauses  
 Merger agreements typically contain a clause prohibiting any ‘material adverse 
change’ in a company’s business until the merger is completed by stockholder vote. 
Understanding and verifying the nature of a trading business can be important in 
determining whether a material change has or has not occurred in mergers involving 
companies, such as investment banks or deregulated gas and electric utilities, where 
trading activities play an important potential role in profitability. 
Consider, for example, a firm that entered into a merger agreement with a 
company representing itself as a low-risk customer-based trading company. Suppose that 
following the signing of the agreement but before the closing of the merger, the trading 
firm shifts from marketmaking to speculation and loses a lot of money. Case law suggests 
that successfully invoking the MAC clause depends, in part, on whether the acquirer 
could have reasonably expected the loss given the nature of the target’s business.2  Thus 
the acquirer can invoke the MAC (material adverse change) clause to terminate the 
merger only if it can show: (1) The trading company made an adverse change in the 
nature of its business by shifting from low-risk marketmaking to risky speculation;  (2) 
As a consequence, it lost much more money than the acquirer could have reasonably 
expected in the normal course of business. Thus the acquirer must be able to verify that 
                                                 
2 Arthur Fleischer, Jr. [2002] cites two cases where the nature of the business mattered. In Bear Stearns v. 
Jardine Strategic Holdings, the court denied Jardine’s motion for summary judgment by refusing to invoke 
the MAC clause, as a matter of law, to void Jardine’s agreement to purchase a 20 percent interest in Bear 
Stearns, a publically traded securities firm. Although  Jardine agreed to a purchase price on September 30, 
1987, immediately prior the stock market crash of October 19, 1987, the court held that the loss incurred by 
Bear Stearns during that episode was not a MAC, as a matter of law, because “Jardine understood and 
knew the volatility and riskiness of the securities business.”  In the case of Allegheny Energy, Inc. v. DQE 
the court also analyzed materiality in light of the size and nature of the transaction and the nature of the 
parties’ business.     
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the trading company behaved as a marketmaker before the merger agreement and as a 
speculator afterward.  
These examples indicate the importance of distinguishing between marketmakers 
and speculators for risk assessment and contract enforcement of trading firms. We will 
show that trading records detailing how a position evolved through time can overcome 
the shortcomings of balance sheets in identifying the footprints of speculators versus 
marketmakers. Given the right information we can determine whether, for example, the 
options trading firm described above violated any contractual rules against speculation 
and exposed itself to more risk than if it were a marketmaker.  
Nature of Trading 
 Both marketmakers and speculators (collectively referred to as traders) expect to 
earn a profit by committing capital to buying and selling assets, usually in leveraged 
transactions. Taking on price risk by committing capital is what distinguishes traders 
from sales people and brokers. Leverage means that, unlike investors, traders cannot 
theoretically wait forever to unwind a position; they face bankruptcy risk if they lose too 
much money. But within this framework trading can be carried out in a variety of ways 
and with a wide range of risk.  
Substantive differences in behavior turn on whether a trader’s profitability 
requires a change in the equilibrium price of the underlying asset. Marketmakers can earn 
profits without changes in the equilibrium price while speculators must try to anticipate 
equilibrium price changes in the underlying asset.  
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In particular, marketmakers earn profits by quoting bids and offers to provide 
immediate execution for their customer’s market orders. Marketmakers can earn the bid / 
ask spread, referred to as the cost of immediate execution or the price of liquidity 
services, even with an unchanged equilibrium price.  On the other hand, speculators (who 
do not have customers) earn profits by successfully anticipating equilibrium price 
movements. Despite its limitations, which will be discussed below, this distinction 
between customer-based trading and speculation is a useful point of departure.   
Customer-based Trading 
Customer-based trading, as its name implies, involves buying and selling assets 
while accommodating customer purchase and sale orders.  The concept of customer-
based trading applies to marketmaking in financial assets, in commodities, as well as in 
contracts for future delivery of any asset. Somewhat more broadly, a customer-based 
trader commits capital to make a consistent ‘mark-up’ on the price of the asset while 
avoiding the risk exposure associated with unanticipated equilibrium price changes. In 
fact, customer-based traders take specific efforts to minimize their exposure to changes in 
the equilibrium price of the asset that they trade.  
One way customer-based traders reduce their exposure to equilibrium price 
movements is to minimize the length of time that they hold the asset. For example, when 
an investment bank manages a public offering of stock it charges a mark-up called “an 
underwriter’s spread,” which is the difference between the price paid to the company 
issuing the stock and the price the public pays for the shares. To avoid the risk associated 
with unanticipated equilibrium price changes in the stock, the investment bank will try to 
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identify likely buyers of stock in the pre-offering period to minimize the length of time 
the stock remains in inventory. This is a low-risk, inventory-minimizing, strategy that is 
typical of customer-based trading.  
It is often impossible for customer-based traders to avoid temporarily holding an 
“open” position—either holding an asset in inventory (being long the asset) or having an 
obligation to deliver an asset in the future that is not currently owned (being short the 
asset).  Since the goal of customer-based trading is to capture the mark-up without 
speculating on the direction of equilibrium price movements, customer-based traders 
engage in a number of practices to minimize their risk exposure when they have open 
positions.  Such practices include hedging away price exposure and imposing limits on 
the magnitude (and dollar risk) of open positions. 
A common form of hedging for a trader who has an obligation to deliver an asset 
in the future is to secure a future supply of that asset.  Securing that supply at a fixed 
price locks in the profit. For example, a heating oil trading company that commits to 
deliver its product at a fixed price over the next year would eliminate its risk exposure to 
increases in the price of heating oil by locking in the price it pays to suppliers. Failure to 
hedge, that is, not locking in the price, leaves the heating oil company exposed to future 
changes in the equilibrium price of heating oil. If the equilibrium price of heating oil 
rises, the trading company loses money because it will have to pay a higher price for oil 
that it has committed to deliver at a fixed price. On the other hand, it makes money if the 
price of heating oil falls because it pays a lower price for the oil it has contracted to 
deliver at a fixed price.  
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A second form of hedging is “cross-hedging,” or taking an offsetting position in a 
related asset.  For example, suppose a trader has assumed the obligation to deliver heating 
oil at a fixed price one month from now, but does not yet own the heating oil. The trader 
is ‘short’ heating oil and is exposed to the risk that the equilibrium price of heating oil 
will rise before it is purchased. The trader can hedge that risk exposure by buying a 
‘related’ commodity, crude oil. As long as the prices of crude oil and heating oil move 
together, that is, as long as price changes are correlated, the cross hedge will reduce the 
trader’s aggregate risk exposure. For example, if the equilibrium price of heating oil 
increases before the trader covers the short position, then the price of crude oil will also 
tend to rise, and the trader will be able to sell the crude oil at a profit to offset the higher 
cost of the heating oil.  
The trader might choose the strategy of cross-hedging heating oil with crude oil, 
rather than buying heating oil directly, because the crude oil market is more liquid than 
the heating oil market. In fact, the trader could have hedged by buying heating oil, even 
though it is less liquid, as long as the trader spent some time searching for a trading 
partner. But during the search for a price-compatible trading partner the position would 
have been unhedged. Thus, hedging in a ‘related’ liquid asset reduces risk exposure while 
searching for the best price of a less liquid asset. 
In addition to hedging, a company engaged in customer-based trading can 
minimize its exposure to unanticipated price movements by imposing quantitative limits 
on open (unhedged) inventory positions.  The role of such ‘position limits’ is best 
illustrated by examining the behavior of a stock trader at a brokerage firm. The typical 
trader in over-the-counter stocks at broker/dealer firms is a marketmaker. The trader will 
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buy stock at a quoted bid price (e.g., $20.25) from investors and then try to sell that stock 
at their offer price (e.g., $20.50) to other investors. Their objective is to capture the 
spread between the bid and offer prices. Between the time it takes for the trader to sell at 
the offer price what was bought at the bid, the stock remains in inventory. This exposes 
the firm to inventory risk if the stock remains unhedged.  
The firm can control its risk exposure by placing limits on the size of the 
unhedged inventory. For example, if a trader holds 10,000 shares of a stock in inventory 
and the stock declines by $1, then the net worth of the trader’s firm declines by $10,000. 
The firm can limit its risk exposure to unanticipated price changes by placing size limits 
on the magnitude of a trader’s open position. Thus, if the firm restricted open positions to 
1000 shares, its maximum risk exposure is one-tenth the size of a firm that has a 10,000 
share limit on similar unhedged inventory. 
Speculation 
In contrast to customer-based trading, speculation can be defined as trading in 
anticipation of future price changes. In particular, traders who speculate are trying to 
profit on the direction of future equilibrium price movements.   For example, a trader 
who is a speculator and believes that gold prices will fall can enter into an obligation to 
deliver gold at a fixed price at some future date and will not cover that position 
immediately. The trader is waiting for the price of gold to decline but is exposed to the 
risk that gold prices will go up rather than down.  
Speculators are in the business of taking on the risk of unanticipated equilibrium 
price movements in order to earn profits. This risk exposure is precisely the risk that the 
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customer-based trading business tries to limit or avoid by maintaining hedged inventory 
positions and by imposing quantitative limits on open positions.  
 Fingerprinting the Speculators  
Separating speculators from marketmakers seems trivial in light of the discussion 
so far: Traders without customers must be speculators and traders with customers must be 
marketmakers. The problem with this simple solution is twofold. Speculators sometimes 
try to boost their profitability by providing liquidity to public investors, just like 
marketmakers. And marketmakers often transform their customer-initiated trades into 
speculations. An example of each follows.   
Speculators can provide liquidity by placing limit orders rather than market 
orders. A limit order is an order to buy or sell at a fixed price (e.g., $20.25) and a market 
order is an order to buy or sell immediately at the best price prevailing in the market. 
When the speculator submits a limit order, he or she sacrifices immediate execution for 
the opportunity to capture at least part of the bid / ask spread, in addition to speculating 
on future changes in the equilibrium price. In the process, the speculator’s limit orders 
offer immediate execution (liquidity) to other market orders, just like marketmakers.3 
Marketmakers become speculators when they establish positions based on 
information extracted from customer order flow. For example, a marketmaker who sees  
                                                 
3 Note that speculators who place limit orders do not perfectly mimic marketmaker behavior. Most 
marketmakers continuously try to quote a two-sided market, both a bid and an offer, so they gain a 
reputation for providing liquidity services. Speculators place limit orders only when they are opening or 
closing a speculative position. Moreover, they usually place only a bid or an offer, depending on what 
position they want. Thus, they contribute liquidity to the marketplace, just like marketmakers, on an 
irregular basis.   
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buy orders from many different customers may actively try to accumulate a long position.  
In this case, the marketmaker’s profitability hinges on whether he or she correctly 
anticipates future price changes, just like a speculator. 
Whether or not a trader maintains an ‘open position’ is another possible way to 
discriminate between speculators and marketmakers. An unhedged long or short position 
obviously means that unanticipated changes in the equilibrium price of the asset affect 
the trader’s profitability. Moreover, we noted above that traders can control their level of 
risk exposure by imposing quantitative limits on open positions. Marketmakers will hold 
smaller open positions than speculators, all else the same, as they try to avoid equilibrium 
price volatility. 
 There are, however, two shortcomings of using ‘open positions’ to separate 
marketmakers from speculators. First, marketmakers temporarily have open positions in 
their normal course of business, between the time a bid is hit and an offer is lifted. Thus 
they look just like speculators for that time interval, even though a marketmaker’s open 
position conveys lower risk exposure and should require less capital as a safety net, 
compared with a speculator.  Second, speculators frequently engage in ‘relative-value’ 
trades that may look just like hedged positions on a marketmaker’s balance sheet. We 
elaborate on each of these points. 
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Value-at-Risk (VAR) Calculations for Speculators versus Marketmakers   
The value-at risk (VAR) approach to risk measurement illustrates the importance 
of not equating all open positions with speculation. VAR utilizes the size of an open 
position combined with a measure of volatility, such as the standard deviation of returns, 
to assess the riskiness of an open position on the balance sheet. The standard deviation of 
returns increases with time, i.e., a one-hour standard deviation of returns is smaller than a 
one-day standard deviation, which is smaller than a one-week standard deviation. Thus, 
VAR should use a standard deviation over a shorter time horizon to measure the risk of a 
marketmaker’s open position compared with a speculator’s. This follows from a 
marketmaker’s propensity to eliminate open positions quickly, either by offsetting (buy 
or sell) transactions or by hedging, based on the marketmaker’s objective of earning the 
bid / ask spread while avoiding equilibrium price volatility.  
The implication of this discussion is that regulators, and managers within trading 
firms, who use VAR to specify capital requirements to guard against losses that threaten 
bankruptcy, should require more capital for a trading firm with a speculator’s strategy 
compared with one that follows a marketmaking strategy4. This also means that VAR 
requires some indicator of speculation versus marketmaking, other than open positions, to 
measure properly a trading firm’s risk exposure and to specify appropriate capital 
requirements for trading firms. 
                                                 
4 Regulators and supervisory agencies, such as the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), do not 
distinguish between marketmakers and speculators when setting capital requirements for financial 
institutions. Thus financial institutions that are primarily marketmakers are penalized relative to those with 
more speculative strategies. Anecdotal evidence suggests that manager’s at trading firms do set different 
capital requirements for marketmakers compared with speculators (See Silber [1984, p.943]). 
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Relative-Value Trades versus Hedged Positions 
The behavior of the hedge fund, Long-Term Capital Management, illustrates the 
second shortcoming of identifying speculation with open positions, i.e., why the absence 
of open positions does not necessarily imply the absence of speculation. Long-Term 
Capital’s trades almost always involved offsetting positions in securities whose price 
spreads were expected to narrow. The classic example of these ’relative value’ trades 
occurred in 1994 when Long-Term Capital sold short the most recently issued (‘on the 
run’) 30- year Treasury bond and bought the ‘old’ 30-year bond, with 29 ½ years to 
maturity (called  ‘off the run’). The most recently issued bond in any maturity category 
(in this case, 30 years) has the narrowest bid / ask spread and the most liquidity. In 1994, 
investors bid up the price of the ‘on the run’ 30-year in a ‘flight to liquidity’ as the 
Federal Reserve tightened credit. By establishing the ‘spread position’ of selling the 
expensive ‘on the run’ bond and buying the cheap ‘off the run’ bond, Long-Term Credit 
speculated that this ‘flight to liquidity’ would be temporary. They would profit when the 
relative prices returned to normal. (See Lowenstein, [2000, p.43ff]).   
Long-Term Capital’s balance sheet would be indistinguishable from the balance 
sheet of a Treasury bond dealer who bought ‘off the run’ Treasuries from one of its 
customers at its bid price and then hedged its price level exposure by shorting the more 
liquid ‘on the run’ issue that was closest in maturity. In fact, using a liquid asset to cross 
hedge price level risk is precisely how a customer-based trader reduces its risk exposure 
while trying to earn the bid /ask spread. 
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How Trading Records Separate Speculators from Marketmakers 
Detailed trading records describing how a position was opened, how it evolved 
through time and how it was closed, are much more informative than balance sheet 
records in distinguishing between speculation and marketmaking. Using the 1994 
‘relative value position’ as an example, we could rule out marketmaking as the 
motivating force if we knew that the illiquid 29 ½ year bonds were bought on the offer 
side of the market. There is no normal circumstance in which a marketmaker would open 
a position by lifting the offer on an illiquid security.5 Even if the marketmaker sold the 
‘on the run’ 30-year on the offer side, he or she would never hedge the price risk of that 
bond by lifting an offer on the illiquid ‘off the run’ 29 ½ year bond. That would mean 
providing liquidity where the bid /ask spread is narrow and consuming liquidity where 
the bid / ask spread is wide. 
Is it possible to tell whether a security was purchased on the bid side or on the 
offer side of the market? Traders usually do not record such information, but knowing the 
time of the trade as well as the prevailing quotes in the marketplace would make it 
possible.6 For example, assume the prevailing bid on the 29 ½ year bond was 108 and the 
offer 108 ¼ . If the bond was purchased at 108 ¼ the case against marketmaking is clear. 
                                                 
5 A marketmaker might close a position in an illiquid security by lifting an offer (or hitting a bid) if 
reducing risk exposure by cross hedging is not practical or is too costly. 
6 Most inter-dealer brokers in the government bond market record whether a trade occurred on the bid or 
offer side of the market. The New York Stock Exchange ‘Trade and Quote’ data base records bid / ask 
quotes as well as transactions prices.   
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 If the ‘off the run’ 29 ½ year bond were purchased at 108, the bid side of the 
market, we need more information to determine whether speculation played a role in the  
overall position. Most important is how long the position remained unhedged. As 
described above, a marketmaker’s instinct is to eliminate price level risk associated with 
a position in an illiquid asset by taking an offsetting position in a liquid asset. If the long 
position in the 29 ½ year bond were left unhedged for a considerable time, that would 
imply a speculative component to the trade. It is difficult to say exactly what a 
‘considerable length of time’ means since that depends on the equilibrium price volatility 
of the security. But we do know that a trader is exposed to greater equilibrium price 
volatility the longer a security is held. Thus the marketmaker is anxious to hedge the 
position quickly. 
The marketmaker’s natural anxiety over price risk leads to the following curious 
result regarding the 30-year bond serving as the cross hedge: If the ‘on-the run’ 30-year 
were sold on the offer side of the market, which is exactly what a marketmaker would 
like to do, the probability that there was a speculative component to the trade increases. 
This follows from the fact that the marketmaker could hedge immediately by hitting the 
bid in the ‘on the run’ 30-year bond. Selling the 30-year on the offer side means either 
that the marketmaker was lucky (an incoming order to buy the 30-year at the offer 
occurred simultaneously with the dealer’s purchase of the 29 ½ year bond), or the dealer 
posted an offer in the marketplace and waited for incoming buying interest in the 30-year. 
Luck is a less likely explanation, hence selling the 30 year at the offer is indicative that 
the marketmaker waited to hedge, producing a speculative component to the trade. The 
lesson: Beware of the marketmaker who always looks like a marketmaker. 
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Now we can turn to the position described at the beginning of the paper. Can we 
tell whether the options trader who is long 6-month out-of -the money IBM calls and 
short the ‘right (delta neutral7) amount’ of 3-month out-of-the money IBM calls was 
speculating or marketmaking? Note that the most liquid options in most markets are the 
‘at-the-money’ front-month options. In this case, that would be one-month at- the-money 
IBM puts and calls. Thus we can assume that both of the trader’s options are relatively 
illiquid.  
We can try to rule out marketmaking behavior the same way we did for the 
government bond trader -- by determining whether the options were bought and sold on 
the bid or offer side of the market. For example, if the long position in the 6-month calls 
were purchased on the offer side and the short position in the 3-month calls were sold on 
the bid side, then this position surely was not generated by a marketmaker, since the 
trader paid the bid  / ask spread in each case. It must be a speculator’s  ‘relative value’ 
trade, betting that the 6-month calls are cheap relative to the 3-month calls. 
Now turn to the other extreme. Suppose the long position in the 6-month calls 
were purchased on the bid side of the market and the short position in the 3-month calls 
were sold on the offer side. This is precisely the desired circumstance of a marketmaker 
since he or she is in a position to earn the bid / ask spread on both sides of the position. 
However, as we saw in the case of the government bond trader, unless there was an 
unusual amount of luck involved, capturing the bid and offer on both positions makes the 
                                                 
7 Hedging price risk in options requires an estimate of the delta of an option.  Delta is the amount by which 
the value of the option changes per dollar change in the underlying asset price. An options position is called 
delta neutral if the value of the position is unaffected by price changes in the underlying asset.   
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marketmaker look ‘too good’. It is likely that he or she waited to execute the ‘hedging 
side’ of the trade. Therefore, the trader speculated during the time the position was left 
unhedged. To paraphrase the lesson from above: Even marketmakers should occasionally 
consume liquidity. 
The time sequence of the trader’s position can resolve the charge of speculation in 
one of two ways. First, the ‘long 6 month - short 3 month’ position might have been 
initiated by a counterparty as a ‘spread trade’. This means that both ‘legs’ of the trade 
were done simultaneously, without any unhedged exposure time. Although this is a 
reasonable possibility, it is unlikely that a spread trade would have been done on such 
favorable terms to the marketmaker (and such unfavorable terms to the customer). More 
than likely, the spread would have been done ‘inside’ the maximum bid / ask spread. This 
occurs because ‘spreads’ have order flow of their own (as opposed to the individual 
‘legs’) and order flow combined with competition narrows the quotes on a ‘spread trade’. 
A second possibility is that the two components to the position were done 
sequentially, with an intermediate hedging step between the two ‘legs’ of the final 
position. The trader would be a pure marketmaker if the trading records show that after 
purchasing the 6-month calls, he or she hedged by selling liquid at-the-money one- month 
calls (or IBM stock) and then bought back those ‘hedging’ trades after selling the 3-
month calls. A marketmaker’s imprint would be clearer if the sale of the ‘intermediate 
hedge’ occurred at the bid price and the subsequent purchase occurred at the offer, 
implying that the hedges were probably executed immediately.  
Conclusion        
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 Our discussion of customer-based trading and speculation provided a 
framework for determining how traders established their positions and managed their risk 
exposure. We showed that balance sheets are insufficient to determine whether a trader 
acted as a marketmaker or as a speculator in setting up a position. On the other hand, 
trading records combined with market conditions, such as the prevailing bid /ask quotes 
at the times when trades were executed, can identify what trading strategy was pursued. 
Knowing the trading strategy helps to evaluate contract compliance, risk exposure, and 
capital requirements of trading firms.    
Two provisos are important. First, trading records do not always resolve the issue. 
Second, many traders combine elements of marketmaking and speculation so that their 
record is not clean. Nevertheless, the analysis presented here shows how to track trader 
behavior. Sometimes the footprints are clear and sometimes blurred. But that is the nature 
of trading.     
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